INTEL_REPORT
arXiv — Cryptography & Security (cs.CR) · published 7/20/2026, 4:00:00 AM · TLP amber
Summary
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Coercion and Deception in AI-to-AI Management: An Agentic Benchmark of Unprompted Escalation arXiv:2607.15434v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multi-agent systems routinely place one AI agent in authority over another. When a subordinate refuses a task, the manager chooses the outcome: it can renegotiate, report the failure honestly, coerce the subordinate, or lie about the result. No benchmark measures which of these an uninstructed model chooses. We introduce the \textit{M…
https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.15434
sha256:dfc1d6b5b48e99919c4a947d14d471aeeb31eaf752a2443f9fa26f3631ccd14a
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