INTEL_REPORT
arXiv — Cryptography & Security (cs.CR) · published 6/11/2026, 4:00:00 AM · TLP amber
Summary
Ingested excerpt (first ~500 chars of normalized text).
When Poison Fails After Retrieval: Revisiting Corpus Poisoning under Chunking and Reranking Pipelines arXiv:2606.11265v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to corpus poisoning attacks that manipulate downstream model outputs through malicious knowledge injection. Existing studies mainly evaluate poisoning under simplified retrieval settings, overlooking practical RAG pipelines involving document chunking, dense retrieval,…
https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.11265
sha256:ff8c29b08bb4728a9cc51d0ab79e49e954d24c1a67124c6fb4bedda195913136
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Indicators
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Malware families
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Threat actors mentioned
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ATT&CK techniques
MITRE IDs referenced in text and present in local technique table.
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